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ABSTRACT 
Research on venture capital internationalization (VC) has expanded rapidly over the last 
decade. This paper reviews the extant literature on VC internationalization and highlights gaps 
in our knowledge. We identify three major research streams within this literature, which revolve 
around the following questions: (1) which VC firms invest across borders and what countries 
do they target, with a macro-economic or a micro-economic focus; (2) how do VC firms address 
the liabilities of non-domestic investing; and (3) what are the real effects of international VC 
investments? We provide an overview of the contributions in these research streams, discuss 
the role of public policy, and suggest avenues for future research. Specifically, we call for a 
deeper understanding of: (1) the functioning and impact of VC firms’ modes of 
internationalization; (2) micro level processes such as the functioning and decision making of 
international investment committees, the interaction between headquarters and local offices, or 
the development of international human and social capital; (3) the role of country institutions 
in VC internationalization and its real effects; and (4) the interplay of international VC with 
alternative financing sources. 
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1. Introduction 
Venture capital is a subset of private equity and refers to investments made for the launch, early 
growth or expansion of companies.1 Many high profile companies including Apple, Facebook, 
Spotify, Google, Gilead Sciences, Starbucks, Airbnb, and Uber raised VC funds in their early 
years to boost their growth. VC firms are financial market intermediaries, specializing in the 
management of information asymmetries and high levels of uncertainty (Amit et al., 1998; 
Gompers and Lerner, 2001). They provide capital to companies that otherwise face severe 
difficulties to attract financing (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Wright and Robbie, 1998). The 
companies that VC firms target are typically small and young, often have negative cash flows, 
operate in new or volatile markets and possess low levels of collateral (Stuart et al., 1999; 
Vanacker and Manigart, 2010; Ueda, 2004). VC firms generally invest in these high-risk 
companies by purchasing equity or equity-linked minority stakes, often take an active 
monitoring and value adding role, and aim for significant capital gains at exit some five to seven 
years after an initial investment (Gompers and Lerner, 2001).  
Due to the need to reduce information asymmetries and related adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems, VC investing has long been a local industry (Cumming and Dai, 2010; 
Wright and Robbie, 1998). The geographical proximity to investment targets was deemed 
necessary to locate and evaluate target companies (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001) and to efficiently 
provide post-investment monitoring and value adding services (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006). As 
a consequence, investing in non-domestic companies brings liabilities of foreignness for VC 
investors (Wright et al., 2005), which are “all additional costs a firm operating in a market 
overseas incurs that a local firm would not incur” (Zaheer, 1995: 343). Compared to domestic 
VC investments, international VC investments present additional risks and challenges because 
                                                          
1 See Drover et al. (2017), Manigart and Wright (2013) and Vanacker and Manigart (2013) for some recent 
overviews of the general venture capital literature. 
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of the geographical, cultural and institutional distance between portfolio companies and VC 
investors increases (Devigne et al., 2016).  
Given the benefits of local presence, cross-border VC investments were a negligible 
fraction of the total VC investment activity prior to the early 1990s (Manigart et al., 2010). The 
enhanced domestic competition in maturing VC industries has, amongst other factors, 
increasingly driven VC firms to search for investment opportunities abroad (e.g., Aizenman 
and Kendall, 2012; Alhorr et al., 2008; Meuleman and Wright, 2011; Tykvová and Schertler, 
2011; Vedula and Matusik, 2017). Chemmanur et al. (2016) report that cross-border investment 
in VC markets increased from 10% of all VC investments in 1991 to 22% in 2008 (based on 
the number of VC investments). Schertler and Tykvová (2011) report that over the period 2000-
2008 cross-border VC deals (i.e., deals with at least one foreign VC) accounted for almost one-
third of total VC deals worldwide. It is clear that the number of international VC transactions 
has become non-negligible. 
Early research on VC in an international context has focused on comparing domestic 
VC behavior between different countries (Sapienza et al., 1996; Manigart et al., 2000, 2002; 
Bruton et al., 2005). This research stream enables to comprehend the differences between VC 
markets in different countries but it does not provide insights into the challenges faced by VC 
firms when entering and managing investments in international markets, which is the focus of 
this paper. While we do not minimize the importance of the numerous papers that have studied 
various aspects of VC in general and VC internationalization in specific, this paper reviews 
three major research streams that we identified in the international VC investment literature. A 
first research stream assesses the country-level and firm-level determinants of international VC 
investments and the characteristics of favored target countries. A second stream of research 
focuses on the strategies international VC investors adopt to mitigate liabilities of foreignness. 
A third research stream examines the outcomes of international VC investments. We then 
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discuss the role of public policy and government VC for VC internationalization. Finally, we 
discuss several general areas for future research on VC internationalization and specific areas 
for future research in the three major streams of research that we reviewed within this literature. 
 
2. Determinants of International VC Investment Flows 
Given the advantages of proximity between VC investors and portfolio companies (Sorenson 
and Stuart, 2001; Mäkelä and Maula, 2006), a first important question is why VC firms invest 
across borders. Below, we discuss both country level and VC firm level determinants of 
international VC flows that have been advanced in the literature.  
 
2.1. Country level determinants 
Extant research highlights several country level determinants that impact international flows of 
VC (e.g., Aizenman and Kendall, 2012; Balcarcel et al., 2010; Guler and Guillén, 2010a; 
Schertler and Tykvová, 2011; Schertler and Tykvová, 2012). Selected studies in this domain—
that have asked the research question why some countries import or export more VC than 
others—are summarized in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
An important determinant driving the import of international VC is the institutional 
development of the target country. International VC investors preferably target institutionally 
developed countries as this creates a more investor-friendly climate with more transparency and 
fewer information asymmetries between VC owners and their portfolio companies (Aizenman 
and Kendall, 2012; Balcarcel et al., 2010; Groh et al, 2010; Guler and Guillén, 2010a). VC 
firms hence invest in target countries characterized by technological, legal, financial, and 
political institutions that create innovative opportunities, protect investors’ rights, facilitate exit, 
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and guarantee regulatory stability. Further, the local presence of qualified human capital is an 
important factor to attract international VC flows in countries (Aizenman and Kendall, 2012). 
Some country characteristics impact both the import and the export of VC (Groh et al, 
2010). Specifically, expected economic growth in the home and target country are important 
factors. Expected GDP growth in the target country is positively associated with the number of 
deals financed by both domestic and international investors, while expected GDP growth in the 
country of origin of the VC investor discourages VC exports (Aizenman and Kendall, 2012; 
Schertler and Tykvová, 2011). These findings suggest that VC firms with more promising 
investment opportunities in their home country prefer to invest more intensively at home and 
less intensively abroad. Furthermore, the size of the stock market is a strong determinant of VC 
import and export. Active stock markets of the target countries provide exit mechanisms for 
successful portfolio companies (Groh et al., 2010). A country with an active stock market will 
not only lead to more domestic deals, it will also attract more foreign investors. Interestingly, 
VC firms operating in a country with an active stock market will also invest more internationally 
(Aizenman and Kendall, 2012; Schertler and Tykvová, 2011).  
Several studies have also investigated the impact of differences between target and 
investor country characteristics to explain VC flows between these countries. Expected 
economic growth differences between countries are positively related to a net flow of VC from 
the low growth to the high growth country (Schertler and Tykvová, 2011). Smaller geographical 
distance (Colombo et al., 2017), common language, colonial ties (Aizenman and Kendall, 2012) 
and between-country trust (Bottazzi et al., 2016) increase the flows of VC between countries. 
When countries’ economies become more integrated, as in the European Union, an increase in 
the amount of international VC investment is likely to follow (Alhorr et al., 2008). Institutional 
environments hence play an important role on international VC flows. 
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The presence of strong industry networks between the VC firm’s home country and its 
target country also enhances international VC flows (Madhavan and Iriyama, 2009). Further, 
“transnational technical communities”, which are groups of immigrants active in both home- 
and host-country technical networks, positively affect international VC flows: higher 
professional and technical immigration levels from a target nation to the U.S. predicts higher 
VC outflows from the U.S. to the target nation (Madhavan and Iriyama, 2009). Hochberg et al. 
(2010), focusing on distinct local VC markets within the US, show that in more densely 
networked local VC markets—i.e., markets where network ties among incumbents are strong—
there is less entry by outside VCs (Hochberg et al., 2010). Outside VC firms with established 
ties with local VC firms are able to overcome this barrier to entry, but other local VC firms may 
react strategically to increased threats of entry and heightened competition by freezing out local 
firms who facilitate entry (Hochberg et al., 2010). It would be interesting to examine such 
potential relationships using a cross-country dataset. 
 
2.2. VC firm level determinants 
Besides country level determinants, several VC firm level determinants impact individual VC 
firm’s probability to invest in foreign countries. Selected studies in this domain are summarized 
in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Structural and strategic features of VC firms—such as their investment focus, type, and 
reputation—impact their probability to invest across borders (Cumming and Dai, 2010; Fritsch 
and Schilder, 2008; Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). VC investment strategies that require higher 
resource consumption in the form of stronger monitoring are associated with a narrower 
geographic scope. This includes acting as lead investor or targeting entrepreneurial ventures 
with very high information asymmetries such as early stage or technology ventures,. Corporate 
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VC firms and more reputable VC firms—i.e., older, larger, more experienced and with a 
stronger IPO track record—exhibit a broader geographic scope (Cumming and Dai, 2010; 
Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). These VC investors seem better able to reduce information 
asymmetries associated with distance. In contrast, government-related VC firms have a narrow 
geographic scope (Bertoni et al., 2015). Finally, VC firms in which investment managers can 
devote more time to their portfolio companies  (i.e. VC firms with more investment executives 
per portfolio company) also have a broader geographic scope (Fritsch and Schilder, 2008), 
consistent with larger distance requiring higher time commitments of the VC investors. 
A VC firm’s human capital (the nature of the experience of its managers) and social 
capital (its network of syndication partners) strongly determine its internationalization strategy. 
First, with respect to a VC firms’ human capital, the international investment experience of a 
VC firm’s investment managers impacts its geographic scope (De Prijcker et al., 2012; Patzelt 
et al., 2009; Schertler and Tykvová, 2011, 2012). VC firms with more managers with foreign 
experience invest more intensively abroad (Schertler and Tykvová, 2011, 2012) because they 
are more familiar with the institutional and legal environment in foreign countries and have a 
better access to international networks. Higher proportions of investment managers with 
international or entrepreneurial experience also lead to a broader geographic investment scope 
(De Prijcker et al., 2012; Patzelt et al., 2009). Inherited knowledge through prior foreign work 
experience of VC firm’s management outside the focal VC firm also has a positive effect on 
internationalization (De Prijcker et al., 2012).  
Second, a VC firm’s social capital also has a major impact on its geographic scope 
(Cumming and Dai, 2010; Iriyama et al., 2010; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Vedula and Matusik, 
2017). Social networks in the VC industry—developed through syndication—diffuse 
information about potential investment opportunities across boundaries, thereby expanding the 
spatial investment radius of VC investors (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Better networked VC 
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firms hence exhibit less local bias (Cumming and Dai, 2010; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). 
Having more, but less intense, international syndicate partners has a stronger positive impact 
on future international activities than having fewer but more intense partners (De Prijcker et al., 
2012). These results show that despite communication technology advances, inherent 
boundaries around the flow of timely, reliable, fine grained and high-quality information still 
produce localized patterns of exchange. Better networked VC firms are able to reduce 
information asymmetries associated with distance through interpersonal social relations with 
local investors. Interestingly, Vedula and Matusik (2017) show that while foreign syndication 
partners play a significant role in US VC firms’ first internationalization decision social cues 
from geographically proximal peers have an even stronger impact.  
 
3. Strategies to Compensate for Liabilities of Foreignness 
Multiple studies show that portfolio companies differ in the way they are sourced, funded, 
syndicated and monitored by domestic versus international VC firms (Mäkelä and Maula, 
2006).2 The increased geographical, cultural and institutional distance that foreign VC firms 
face, severely limits domestically used strategies to mitigate information asymmetries. In a local 
context, VC firms manage uncertainty by sourcing favorable investment targets through their 
entrusted local networks and intensive screening involving face to face meetings (Sorenson and 
Stuart, 2001). Moreover, VC firms provide their portfolio companies with more than financial 
resources: after the investment, they provide value adding services and access to other resources 
(Sapienza et al., 1996; Hsu, 2004). Value adding activities are hindered when investing across 
borders, because these activities often require proximity and a fine-grained understanding of 
                                                          
2 In this review, we focus on VC firm internationalization and how VC firms manage the liabilities related to their 
own internationalization. It is important to acknowledge that other studies have also focused on the 
internationalization of VC-backed companies and how VC firms manage the liabilities of internationalization by 
their portfolio companies (e.g., LiPuma and Park, 2014). 
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the local environment, especially for early stage portfolio companies (Devigne et al., 2013). As 
a result, VC firms investing internationally will have to adapt their investment process rather 
than merely implementing the “recipes” from their domestic markets. For instance, foreign VC 
firms in India place greater emphasis on product market factors and accountants’ reports than 
domestic VC firms when selecting investment targets in India (Wright et al., 2002) and they 
prefer strategic monitoring and advice rather than monitoring of the operational activities 
because the former is easier to provide across distance (Pruthi et al., 2003).  
Table 3 summarizes selected studies that examine how VC investors minimize liabilities 
of foreignness when investing across borders.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The first step in the VC cycle is to generate deal flow from which to select promising 
investment targets. A VC firm can either proactively search for deals (solicited deals) or 
passively wait for deals approaching (unsolicited deals) through the entrepreneur, the VC firm’s 
network or an intermediary (Lu and Hwang, 2010). Generating sufficient deal flow is more 
challenging for VCs operating across borders, as foreign VC firms originate fewer unsolicited 
deals from their networks compared to domestic VC firms (Lu and Hwang, 2010). In response, 
international VC firms mainly draw upon their home country advantages by originating more 
solicited deals from networks (Lu and Hwang, 2010). Moreover, some VC firms’ domestic 
network advantages, such as their social status advantages, are transferable from the VC firms’ 
home country to the target company’s country (Guler and Guillén, 2010b), leading to higher 
deal flow generation for higher status international VC firms.  
Selecting the right investment targets among the deals presented is one of the most 
important drivers of VC success (Sorensen, 2007). When targeting portfolio companies in a 
foreign country,  a higher geographical and cultural distance and a lower embeddedness in the 
portfolio companies’ environment hampers the transfer of soft information (Devigne et al., 
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2016). A strategy used by cross-border VC firms to overcome information problems is therefore 
to select portfolio companies with lower ex-ante information asymmetries. Foreign VC firms 
are more likely to invest in more information-transparent portfolio companies, i.e., in a later 
stage, in a later round or in larger deals (Dai et al., 2012; Schertler and Tykvová, 2011).  
When structuring the cross-border investment, deal features and legal contracts may 
also be used as a tool to mitigate information problems (Balcarcel et al., 2010; Bengtsson and 
Ravid, 2009; Bottazzi et al., 2009). Cross-border VC investors invest larger amounts in 
portfolio companies in countries with worse legal protection (Balcarel et al., 2010). This finding 
suggests that cross-border VC firms mitigate contracting problems in countries with weak legal 
environments by taking larger equity stakes, which enables them to enforce control rights which 
courts may not be able to adequately enforce with smaller stakes. Further, when the 
geographical distance between a VC firm and its portfolio companies increases, investors 
negotiate contracts which give more high powered incentives to entrepreneurs, such as cash 
flow contingencies (Bengtsson and Ravid, 2009), thereby more strongly aligning the interests 
of investors and entrepreneurs. These findings supports the view that distance makes 
monitoring more difficult and that VC investors try to mitigate this issue through contracting.  
Furthermore, VC firms’ domestic legal system impacts their behavior abroad. For 
example, VC firms from common law countries are more prone to use downside protection 
clauses, not only in their domestic investments but also when investing across borders (Balcarel 
et al., 2010). Bottazzi and colleagues (2009) further show that more developed legal systems in 
a VC firm’s home country are associated with more VC involvement and the VC investor’s 
legal system is more important than the portfolio company’s legal system in determining 
investor behavior even when investing abroad. 
Another way to address problems of information asymmetries, monitoring, and resource 
transfer is to syndicate with local VC firms as this strategy allows to outsource the monitoring 
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and value adding functions to local co-investors who are not hindered by geographical, cultural 
or institutional distance (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008; Devigne et al., 2013; Nahata et al., 2014; 
Huang et al., 2015; Chemmanur et al., 2016). Additionally, a syndicate comprising both local 
and international VC investors provides a broader skill set, experience, and networks that may 
generate additional value to companies (Schertler and Tykvová, 2012; Devigne et al., 2013). 
Co-investing with domestic VC investors is especially used when entering less institutionally 
developed countries (Chemmanur et al., 2016; Dai et al., 2012; Guler and Guillén, 2010b; 
Meuleman and Wright, 2011; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001), although country level uncertainty 
decreases the likelihood of co-investments with local investors (Liu and Maula, 2016).  
Yet, not all cross-border VC firms need local firms to mitigate information and resource 
transfer problems. Organizational learning, including a VC firm’s focal country level 
experience and its overall multinational experience, reduce its need to rely on local partners 
over time (Meuleman and Wright, 2011; Liu and Maula, 2016). Further, VC firms with more 
investment executives per portfolio company learn faster and hence have a lower probability to 
engage in cross-border syndication (Meuleman and Wright, 2011).  
With which domestic VCs do cross-border VCs prefer to syndicate? Cross-border VCs 
typically prefer domestic VCs with whom they have pre-existing ties. However, high-quality 
legal frameworks and industry associations facilitate syndication between cross-border and 
local VCs and diminish the need for cross-border VCs to rely on pre-existing ties (Meuleman 
et al., 2017).  
Finally, the internationalization literature suggests yet another strategy to compensate 
for liabilities of foreignness, which is to set up a local branch office. This strategy ensures 
proximity to entrepreneurs, thereby reducing asymmetric information problems (Pruthi et al., 
2009). The foreign head office will typically be represented in the branches’ investment 
committee that decides on investments and exits. This strategy allows the foreign head office 
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to manage challenges that otherwise would require the deployment of expatriates (Pruthi et al., 
2009). When employing local investment professionals in the branches, cultural and 
institutional differences are reduced, thereby further facilitating the transfer of knowledge and 
advice to companies (De Prijcker et al., 2012; Pruthi et al., 2009; Devigne et al., 2016). In the 
Chinese context, Huang et al. (2015) find that having a Chinese office made foreign VCs less 
likely to syndicate with local VC, thereby suggesting that VC firms with a local branch feel 
they can address liabilities of foreignness by themselves (through the local office). VC firms’ 
decision to open a branch in a foreign region is strongly driven by the success rate of VC 
investments in that region (Chen et al., 2010). Research on the use of branch offices in the VC 
industry remains very limited, however. 
 
4. Outcomes of International VC Investments  
What matters for both entrepreneurs and VC investors is the development of the portfolio 
company, which is ultimately associated with the exit of investors. The exit from portfolio 
companies is the last and perhaps most important step in the VC cycle (Gompers and Lerner, 
2001; Wright and Robbie, 1998). First, the exit route determines the VC firms’ returns (Ruhnka 
and Young, 1987). Second, entrepreneurs are highly involved because the exit route not only 
impacts their financial return but also their future role within the company. Importantly, a 
successful outcome for the VC investor is not by definition a successful outcome for the 
entrepreneur. We will hence discuss the outcomes of international VC investments from the 
perspective of both the portfolio company and the VC investor. 
 
4.1. Outcomes from the perspective of the portfolio company 
International VC investors impact their portfolio companies’ development differently compared 
to domestic VC investors. Companies backed by cross-border VC investors only grow more 
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strongly in the long term (but not in the short term), while companies backed by a syndicate 
comprising both domestic and cross-border VC investors outperform all other combinations 
(e.g., domestic VC or cross border VC investors only) in terms of growth in sales, total assets 
and employment (Devigne et al., 2013). This finding suggests that domestic and cross-border 
VC investors can play synergistic roles as their portfolio companies grow and thereby require 
different resources or capabilities over time.  
More specifically, foreign VC investors may help their portfolio companies in their 
internationalization (e.g., Chahine et al., 2018; Cumming et al., 2009b). Foreign VC firms 
located in a portfolio company’s export market can be especially valuable by legitimizing the 
unknown new company in that market (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005; Mäkelä and Maula, 2006), 
by playing a greater advisory and monitoring role (Chahine et al., 2018) or by relocating the 
company into that market (Cumming et al., 2009a). Local VC firms, therefore, may actively 
help their portfolio companies in attracting cross-border VC investors, especially if portfolio 
companies seek to internationalize (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008) or require large amounts of 
specialized VC funds that are not always available in the home country (Vanacker et al., 2014). 
However, as cross-border investors tend to drive their portfolio companies towards their home 
markets, the above benefits may turn into disadvantages if portfolio companies’ export markets 
differ from the home markets of the cross-border VC investors (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005).  
Moreover, not all portfolio companies develop positively. Mäkelä and Maula (2006) 
develop a theoretical model which proposes that if a portfolio company’s prospects decrease, a 
cross-border VC firm’s commitment will drop more strongly compared to that of a domestic 
VC investor. Due to their lower embeddedness in the portfolio company’s local environment 
and lower attachment to the entrepreneur, cross-border VC investors have lower attachments to 
their portfolio companies, thereby easing the abandonment decision (Devigne et al., 2016). This 
relationship is magnified with greater geographical distance but mitigated by the relative 
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investment size and the investor’s embeddedness in local syndication networks (Mäkelä and 
Maula, 2006).  
In Table 4, we summarize selected studies that have primarily focused on the 
consequences of international VC investments from the portfolio company’s perspective. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
4.2. Outcomes from the perspective of the VC firm 
Studies on the investment success of cross-border investors present mixed evidence. On the one 
hand, controlling for portfolio company quality and VC firm reputation, some studies have 
shown that cross-border VC firms are less likely than domestic VC firms to have successful 
exits (Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 2013; Li et al., 2014). Both institutional and cultural 
distances decrease the likelihood of a successful exit, although a VC investor’s international 
experience may attenuate the negative effect of institutional distance (Li et al., 2014). This 
evidence is consistent with liabilities of foreignness inhibiting a successful investment process, 
hampered by increased information asymmetries and more limited resource transfers (Devigne 
et al., 2016).  
On the other hand, other studies have suggested and shown that cross-border VC 
investors might bring additional exit opportunities (Bertoni and Groh, 2014). Specifically, 
controlling for firm performance, investor characteristics and local exit conditions, these studies 
show that cross-border VC firms have a higher probability of M&A and IPO exit (Cumming et 
al., 2016), have faster M&A and IPO exits (Espenlaub et al., 2015), and have higher IPO 
valuations (Chahine et al., 2018; Cumming et al., 2016). Cumming et al. (2016) do not find a 
difference between domestic and international VC M&A exit probability, however. The 
probability of a successful exit is especially higher for an international VC investor when 
investing in later stage companies (Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 2013). Moreover, Knill 
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(2009) shows that international geographical diversification is—on a VC firm portfolio level—
the only diversification strategy which has no negative effect on the portfolio company exit 
performance, in contrast with industry or stage diversification. Nahata et al. (2014) show that 
the cultural distance between countries of the portfolio company and its lead VC investor 
positively affects exit success. 
The above contradicting findings show that more research is needed to fully understand 
the relationship between international VC investing and exit outcomes. This relationship might, 
for example, be affected by macro forces such as the (difference in) institutional contexts of 
both investor and portfolio company, or micro forces such as VC firm and portfolio company 
characteristics.  
Recent studies stress the benefits of local syndication for exit success of cross-border 
VC investments (thus, combining local and foreign VCs), particularly for early stage 
investments (Chemmanur et al., 2016; Cumming and Dai, 2010; Dai et al., 2012; Nahata et al., 
2014; Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 2013; Wang and Wang, 2012). Specifically, portfolio 
companies with both cross-border and local VC investors are about 5% more likely to exit 
successfully compared with portfolio companies backed by foreign VC firms only (Dai et al., 
2012). Interestingly, while Chemmanur et al. (2016) stress that this positive relationship is only 
present when investing in emerging countries, Nahata et al. (2014) find this relationship only 
in developed economies. Chemmanur et al. (2016) show that—in emerging nations and 
controlling for endogenous participation and syndication by cross-border VC firms—syndicates 
composed of domestic and cross-border VC firms have more successful exits and higher post-
IPO operating performance relative to syndicates of purely domestic VC firms or purely cross-
border VC firms. These findings are again consistent with local VC syndication as a powerful 
tool to overcome liabilities of foreignness. Still, there is also evidence from US VC investors, 
suggesting that the addition of a domestic partner in their cross-border deals is not associated 
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with the probability of an IPO exit and is even negatively associated with an M&A exit 
(Wuebker et al., 2015). Again, more research is needed to clarify these contradictory findings. 
The effect of foreign VC firms’ human capital on the exit success of their portfolio 
companies is not well understood yet. While Hursti and Maula (2007) find that the international 
experience of the VC management team is positively related to exit performance (more foreign 
IPOs) in developed markets, Wang and Wang (2011) show that there is little correlation 
between a foreign VC firms’ human capital, such as its experience, networks and reputation, 
and portfolio companies’ exit performance in emerging markets. Instead, the domestic 
entrepreneurs’ experience is crucial for exit performance in emerging markets (Wang and 
Wang, 2011).  
Target country characteristics also impact an international VC firm’s exit performance. 
Superior legal rights and law enforcement and better-developed stock markets significantly 
enhance VC long term exit performance (Nahata et al., 2014). More specifically, foreign VC-
backed portfolio companies are more likely to successfully exit through an IPO or an M&A and 
investment durations are shorter in economically free countries (Wang and Wang, 2012). The 
legal protection rights of VC firms’ country of origin within the VC syndicate of an IPO firm 
negatively impacts the underpricing of IPOs, which is a sign of higher IPO quality; this negative 
association is stronger for IPOs involving foreign VC firms (Chahine and Saade, 2011). This 
finding expands prior research on VC syndication by showing that the shareholders’ protection 
rights of the country of origin of foreign VC syndicate members signal the quality of portfolio 
companies at IPO.  
Surprisingly, cultural distance between the portfolio company’s and the lead investor’s 
country positively affects VC success especially in emerging economies: it creates incentives 
for rigorous ex-ante screening, improving VC performance (Nahata et al., 2014). Additionally, 
Bottazzi and colleagues (2016) find a negative relationship between trust in a country and exit 
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performance, especially for IPOs. However, more sophisticated investors are more likely to 
make low trust investments, and doing so they achieve superior performance (Bottazzi et al., 
2016). Lack of trust in a country is hence a hurdle to making VC investments, but cross-border 
investors who overcome this hurdle tend to do well.  
In Table 5, we provide an overview of selected studies from an increasingly rich 
literature that has primarily examined the consequences of international VC investors from the 
VC firm’s perspective.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
5. Discussion 
The increasing occurrence of cross-borders investments despite liabilities of foreignness and 
distance raises the interesting questions of what drives these investments, how they are managed 
and what their outcomes are. So far, we have reviewed and synthesized the extant literature on 
these three major research streams of VC internationalization. In this section, we provide a 
discussion of important methodological challenges that have characterized the broader VC 
internationalization literature and beyond. We further provide an integration of the diverse 
theoretical perspectives that have been employed to understand the VC internationalization 
phenomenon. 
 
5.1. Methodological issues 
A first important methodological concern that casts a long shadow over the many reviewed 
studies is that the receipt of international VC is endogenous (for a similar problem in the broader 
strategy and entrepreneurial finance literature, see Shaver, 1998 and Eckhardt et al., 2006). 
Companies do not attract financing from international VC firms at random; rather, they may 
choose specific investors that are optimal given their characteristics and those of their industries 
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and may thereby deliberately try to raise international or domestic VC. Moreover, international 
VC firms themselves do not invest at random; rather, they may choose specific portfolio 
companies, including those that are of higher quality and thus more likely to succeed. When 
empirical models do not account for such multistage selection on hard-to-measure or 
unobservable characteristics, this may potentially lead to misspecified models and incorrect 
conclusions.  
Unfortunately, few of the reviewed papers employ natural experiments or more 
advanced econometric techniques beyond the Heckman selection approach to disentangle 
“selection” effects from “treatment” effects or the actual influence of international VC. There 
are notable exceptions, however, particularly in the more recent literature. For example, 
Chemmanur et al. (2016) use an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach to account for 
endogeneity of international VC participation and endogeneity in the syndication choice of 
international VCs. They also use natural experiments using bilateral air service agreements and 
terror activities in India. As another example, Cumming et al. (2016) also use an IV approach. 
Specifically, they first estimate the level of internationalization in syndication and, then, use 
this predicted value as the new variable of interest in the analysis of the portfolio company’s 
exit.  
 A second important concern relates to the secondary data sources that are generally used 
in the international VC literature and beyond (e.g., Cumming et al., 2009b; Cumming and 
Johan, 2017). Tables 1 - 5 show a clear dominance of studies that use commercial databases 
such as Thomson’s VentureXpert and Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr. These databases have specific 
issues. For example, there are often a significant number of “undisclosed” investors (Huang et 
al., 2015). Moreover, investments attributed to the local subsidiary of a foreign VC firm are 
often considered domestic (Huang et al., 2015). In addition, these databases also give rise to 
several biases, including a statistical bias due to differences in variable definitions (e.g., the 
20 
 
definition of venture capital is not always consistent across countries) and collection methods 
(Cumming et al., 2009b) thereby sometimes under-representing specific types of investments 
such as early-stage and small VC investments, or specific countries.  These databases also lack 
control groups of companies that did not search for (international) VC, or tried to obtain such 
financing but were unsuccessful (Cumming and Johan, 2017). Previous work has shown that 
the use of different international datasets can provide different answers to research questions 
(Cumming et al., 2014), which might explain some of the contradictory findings. 
 Scholars have addressed these challenges by combining multiple data sources and 
including research teams from multiple countries. A good example is the VICO database 
capturing detailed data on companies from seven European countries that raised VC and 
matched firms that did not raise VC (Bertoni and Martí, 2011). To construct the database 
multiple data sources have been used, including Thomson ONE (VentureXpert), Zephyr but 
also national databases. The data was consolidated by a central authority that relied on the data 
collection efforts and experience from teams in each country. Other scholars have relied on 
alternative data sources, such as surveys or proprietary data from specific VC firms. But these 
data sources, obviously, have their own specific shortcomings, including relatively limited 
response rates or additional selection issues.  
 
5.2. Theoretical integration 
Different theoretical lenses have been used to examine VC internationalization (see Tables 1- 
5) and, more specifically, the three major research streams of VC internationalization that we 
have reviewed.  
Economic theories and institutional theory have been used to explain the international 
VC phenomenon both at the micro-level (e.g., contract design and investment outcome) and at 
the macro level (e.g., in explaining international flows of VC). Compared to domestic VC 
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investors, international VC investors are prone to liabilities of foreignness, induced by increased 
geographic, legal and cultural distance between international investors and portfolio companies. 
Liabilities of foreignness increase information asymmetries and make monitoring more costly, 
thereby increasing agency risks. Unsurprisingly, multiple studies have used agency theory and 
information asymmetry perspectives to increase our theoretical understanding of how 
international VC investors can minimize these risks.  
VC investors are also confronted with heightened difficulties to provide resources to 
their portfolio companies, although they may provide more diverse and complementary 
resources. Consequently, the resource based view of the firm (and related perspectives 
including social capital theory and the knowledge-based view) has been proposed as an 
alternative lens to understand the international VC process. Network theory has also received a 
lot of attention, with (local) syndicate partners being identified as important resource providers 
enabling to alleviate problems related to access to deal flow, agency risk, information 
asymmetries and resource access. A VC firm’s network of syndicate partners is hence an 
essential resource, fitting in the resource based view of the firm as well. It enables access to 
investment targets, broadens the resource base available for a portfolio company and helps the 
transfer of resources to the portfolio company.  
Taken together, scholars have employed diverse theoretical frameworks to gain better 
insights into the challenges, drivers, strategies, and outcomes of international VC investments. 
We next discuss the role of public policy as an important and specific type of VC firm, before 
providing a more in-depth discussion of future research opportunities.  
 
6. Public Policy and VC Internationalization 
Governments, both at the national and local level, often try to play an active role in stimulating 
the development of larger and broader domestic VC markets. They can do so in several ways, 
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for example, through direct government investment programs or through government programs 
that foster the formation of partnerships with private VC firms. Several studies provide 
excellent overviews of the debate if governments have been able to fulfill this role (e.g., 
Colombo et al., 2016; Cumming, 2011). A key concern, however, is the possibility that private 
VC may get crowded out by public VC in domestic markets. Government interventions may 
further reduce cross-border investments by local private VC firms (Cumming, 2011). In this 
section, we more specifically focus on the potential role of governments in stimulating 
international VC inflow. 
 Should governments stimulate investments by cross-border VC firms into their country 
or region? Our review shows that the empirical evidence on the outcomes of international VC 
investments is not uniformly positive. Still, recent evidence, taking endogeneity issues into 
account, suggests that international VC firms, particularly in combination with domestic VC 
firms, foster firm development, create additional exit opportunities, and create more value at 
exit (e.g., Bertoni and Groh, 2014; Chahine et al., 2018; Chemmanur et al., 2016; Cumming et 
al., 2016; Devigne et al., 2013). While these effects are at times more or less statistically and 
economically significant, even non-effects can be “good news” because governments can 
pursue to create more active domestic VC markets through fostering international VC flows 
that do not have detrimental effects for domestic portfolio companies and exit opportunities by 
domestic VC investors. 
Moreover, for companies in particular industries that require considerable amounts of 
money such as biotech—and that operate in countries with developing VC markets—
international VC investments might be crucial to grow into international players. For instance, 
in the Flemish region in Belgium, investments by international (including UK, US, French and 
Dutch) VC firms have played a critical role in the development of high growth biotech 
companies (Vanacker et al., 2014). It is also generally ignored that cross-border VC firms may 
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not only influence the prospects of local companies and exit opportunities in a direct way; they 
can also stimulate the professionalization of local VC firms. Such prospects may be particularly 
important in countries with developing VC markets. 
 Our review has provided a framework of the mechanisms through which governments 
can facilitate inflows of international VC (from particular countries). In particular, governments 
can shape the formal institutional (i.e., regulatory, political and economic) context (Holmes et 
al., 2016) to foster the inflow of international VC. By stimulating international networks, and 
international human capital formation, governments may also be influential in shaping the 
inflow of international VC thereby targeting specific countries that represent, for example, 
important export markets. Such effects can be realized through their own government-related 
VC investors or indirectly by providing support (e.g. through a fund of fund investment 
strategy) to local or foreign independent and other VC investors. 
 A particular point of concern for policy makers, related to international VC investments 
in domestic companies, might be that international investors often play an active role in venture 
relocation (Cumming et al., 2009a) and provide international exit opportunities (Bertoni and 
Groh, 2014). Policy makers might thereby fear that the best companies leave their home 
country. This should not necessarily be problematic, however, as long as a domestic presence 
is ensured or if the outflow of companies is balanced with a comparable inflow of companies. 
Moreover, limiting cross-border VC flows to minimize the risk that local firms would relocate 
may turn out to be ineffective. Recent evidence from US data suggests that high-tech 
entrepreneurs in states with limited VC availability are more likely to relocate their activities to 
states where VC is particularly abundant (De Prijcker et al., 2018). While this evidence 
represents within country evidence, there is also anecdotal evidence that entrepreneurs move 
across borders to increase their odds of raising international VC.   
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7. Avenues for Future Research 
7.1. General Gaps  
We have summarized an increasingly rich literature on VC firm internationalization, with a 
focus on international flows of VC, the international VC investment process and the outcome 
of international VC investments. Yet, many studies have treated VC firm internationalization 
as a dummy variable: VC firms have either conducted cross-border investments or not 
(Cumming et al., 2009b). While this represents an important dimension of VC firm 
internationalization, several other dimensions have been relatively ignored, such as the 
internationalization intensity and diversity, the entry mode or the impact of the institutional 
context.  
Studies in international business have also explored other aspects of 
internationalization, such as its intensity (defined as foreign sales to total sales, which in our 
context could represent the size of foreign investments relative to total investments) and 
diversity (defined as the number of countries, sometimes weighted by their geographical and 
cultural difference from the home country, in which a firm generates sales, which in our context 
could represent the number of foreign countries in which a VC firm has invested) (Fernhaber 
et al., 2008; Paeleman et al., 2017).  
Relatedly, an important area in international business relates to the entry strategy of 
firms (Zhao et al., 2004). How do they enter foreign markets: through greenfield investments, 
acquisitions, joint ventures, or other entry modes? VC firms seeking international expansion 
face a comparable choice. They may either directly invest from their home country or they may 
set up a local subsidiary. Many VC firms develop a “hub” strategy, whereby they set up a 
foreign subsidiary which serves a whole region spanning several countries. For example, many 
foreign VC firms set up a subsidiary in London with the aim to invest across Continental 
Europe, or invest in East Asia through a subsidiary in Hong Kong or Singapore. Surprisingly, 
25 
 
VC firms’ entry modes of internationalization have been largely neglected in the VC literature. 
Both the drivers and impact of the internationalization mode should be further examined (Guler 
and Guillén, 2010a; Pruthi et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2002). A related interesting question is 
whether there is a life-cycle to these entry modes (Wright et al., 2002). Do VC firms first invest 
across borders from their headquarters, which is a flexible entry mode that can easily be 
reversed, and only invest in a local subsidiary at a later stage, for which the investments are 
larger and more irreversible? Does entry mode depend on the target country?  
In addition, while research on VC internationalization is growing rapidly, research on 
its flip side, namely de-internationalization, is scant. Internationalization moves may fail, 
leading firms to abandon their international activities and thus de-internationalize. Research 
focusing on this withdrawing process from international markets is critical as factors that 
influence the decision to pursue a particular strategic course of action, such as 
internationalization, and factors that influence the de-commitment from that course of action, 
such as de-internationalization, are expected to be fundamentally different. Moreover, recent 
events including Brexit (e.g., Cumming and Zahra, 2016) and the election of U.S. President 
Trump with his “deglobalization” rhetoric might be additional forces that impact VC de-
internationalization. Unfortunately, research on the firm level (e.g., performance of prior 
international investments) and macro-level (e.g., Brexit) mechanisms that may drive VC 
investors to abandon their prior internationalization strategies is completely lacking. 
Further, the role of the institutional context, both in the home and the recipient country, 
warrants further scrutiny. For example, the decision of a French VC firm to invest in a Belgian 
company (with both countries having a rather comparable institutional context) is expected to 
be fundamentally different from the decision to invest in a US or Chinese company. Some 
studies have indeed reported important differences between international VC behavior in 
developed and emerging markets (e.g., Dai et al., 2012). A further analysis of the differences 
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in VC firm internationalization between developing and developed markets—and different 
institutional contexts more broadly (Cumming et al., 2017)—provides an interesting area of 
future research. This is especially interesting, as there is currently an increased tendency of VC 
investors from developing markets (e.g. China, Russia) to invest in more developed countries. 
For example, an important question is whether there are differences between emerging VC 
markets compared to developed markets in structuring and monitoring investments (Wright et 
al., 2002).  
Many studies on VC internationalization decisions have focused on samples of 
independent VC firms. Still, in many countries, other types of VC investors are active including 
government VC, corporate VC, and bank-affiliated VC. Bertoni et al. (2015) illustrate that 
corporate VC investors are 77.4 % more inclined to invest across borders. Governments VC 
investors, however, are especially specialized in domestic companies. They are 73 % more 
oriented to invest domestically than the full sample. Nevertheless, research on how 
internationalization of corporate or bank-related VC investors might be different, for example 
due to the international scope of their parent company, is lacking. Some studies on the outcomes 
of international VC investments have controlled for VC investor type. However, these studies 
do not examine how different types of international investors uniquely behave or influence 
investments outcomes. This raises important questions for future research. For example, how 
do syndicates comprising local investors and different types of international VC investors 
influence outcomes?  
We further lack insight into micro level processes in international VC firms. For 
example, the role of the investment committee in international investment decision-making or 
the implications of the investment committee’s structure and composition for international 
staffing are still not fully understood (Pruthi et al., 2009). It would also be relevant to investigate 
in more detail the process of international staffing, especially from the perspective of local 
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offices (Pruthi et al., 2009). Detailed longitudinal case studies might be very instrumental here, 
to obtain a detailed insight into these processes. 
Finally, another general gap in our understanding of VC firm internationalization is how 
other sources of entrepreneurial finance might work with VC to enable internationalization. The 
international VC literature, just like the VC literature in general, is largely segmented by the 
source of financing (Cumming and Johan, 2017). In other words, VC studies generally 
exclusively focus on VC but ignore the other sources of financing that companies attract. With 
the growing importance of ‘new’ sources of financing such as crowdfunding (Cumming and 
Johan, 2016), business angel groups (Shane, 2008) and Initial Coin Offerings, and with the 
importance of bank finance for SMEs in some countries (REF), it would be interesting to gain 
a better understanding of how these other sources of financing influence the behavior of VC 
investors and their cross-border activities more specifically. In the case of crowdfunding, for 
example: Do larger local crowdfunding markets compete with local VC firms for deals, and if 
so does it push local VC firms to invest across borders? Does the visibility provided by 
crowdfunding campaigns remove some of the barriers encountered by foreign VC firms? Do 
international investors syndicate with angel investors, who mainly operate locally, but who may 
be strongly embedded in their region? Does an active bank financing market enhance or 
discourage international VC investment?  
 
7.2. Current gaps in the determinants of international VC investments 
Research provides several areas of future research on country level determinants of 
international VC flows. Some of the unresolved questions are: Are there temporal variations in 
the internationalization of the VC industry? For example, the VC industry is cyclical and prone 
to periodic booms and busts. Could there be differences in global inflow and outflow patterns 
depending on these cyclical stages (Madhavan and Iriyama, 2009)? Further, while it has been 
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shown that the development of the stock market matters for VC internationalization, we know 
very little so far about the potential that the banking sector development might play for VC 
internationalization. What drives the number of countries in which the VC firm has international 
investments (De Prijcker et al., 2012)? Do international VC firms find foreign countries more 
attractive based on the characteristics of the available co-investors to syndicate or on the 
presence of other home-country VC firms (Guler and Guillén, 2010a)? What is the impact of 
technical immigration as opposed to overall professional immigration on international VC 
flows? Such refinements would allow scholars to get closer to the drivers of international 
entrepreneurship in high-technology domains (Iriyama et al., 2010). 
Next to country level determinants, the literature also provides areas of future research 
on VC firm determinants. Do different VC investors demonstrate different levels of tolerance 
for risk taking related to a global investment strategy? What are the determinants of such 
differences, as well as their consequences (Madhavan and Iriyama, 2009)? Finally, country 
level and firm level determinants will not necessarily operate independently (e.g., Vanacker et 
al., 2014), which begs the question how country level factors (including formal and informal 
country level institutions) interact with firm level factors? 
 
7.3. Current gaps in the strategies to compensate for liabilities of foreignness  
Although several studies have started to investigate how international VC investors cope with 
liabilities of foreignness, there remain unanswered research questions. First, analyzing 
companies that have tried but failed to raise foreign VC would help to understand more 
accurately the role of local investors in raising foreign VC (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008). Next, 
are there differences between domestic and international VC firms in screening and valuing 
potential portfolio companies? More specifically, to what extent do foreign VC firms adapt 
their approaches to local market conditions? If so, how do they adapt their approaches to deal 
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with different asymmetric information problems (Pruthi et al., 2003)? Do VC firms, for 
instance, replicate the network connections present in their home countries in the new markets 
they enter (Guler and Guillén, 2010b)? Foreign VC firms may also gain external knowledge 
through domestic syndication partners that have relevant international investment experience 
or through other network partners, for example, international shareholders or service providers 
such as lawyers or consultants. To what extent are these other partners substitutes for foreign 
syndication partners, or do they complement them in different ways (De Prijcker et al., 2012)? 
Do the technology level of potential investments, the background and experience levels of the 
VC firm’s general partners, and the market for IPOs or other forms of exit available to VC firms 
impact the investment preferences of VC firms (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992)?  
How can mechanisms, such as expatriating staff and hiring local talents effectively 
overcome hurdles related to information friction and cultural differences in international VC 
investments (Dai et al., 2012)? In which environments do local executives effectively substitute 
for local co-investors for internationalizing firms seeking to invest in foreign markets (Pruthi et 
al., 2009)? Is it possible to make the expertise of key people in the home country available 
through investment committees (Pruthi et al., 2009)? How can VC firms use a mix of 
strategies—attracting local partners, working with local VC firms or setting up local branches—
in order to deal with the peculiarities of the local environment (Meuleman and Wright, 2011)?  
 
7.4. Current gaps related to the outcomes of international investments 
Given the mixed evidence presented before, several important questions on the outcomes of 
international VC investments require further research attention. What is the relation between 
distance and the probability of non-rational continuation of commitment to a portfolio company 
that does not meet the initial prospects (i.e., escalation of commitment) (Mäkelä and Maula, 
2006; Devigne et al., 2016)? Is international VC firm’s commitment influenced by country-
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specific factors other than distance (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006) or by entry mode (Devigne et 
al., 2016)? Foreign VC firms may help professionalize local entrepreneurial firms given their 
experience of advising and nurturing portfolio companies in their home countries. Do these 
local entrepreneurial companies have spill over effects on their peers which are currently not 
financed by foreign VC firms (Dai et al., 2012)? In the same vein, how does the presence of 
foreign VC firms, either directly or through a local subsidiary, and their partnership with local 
VC firms help professionalize local VC firms (Dai et al., 2012)?  
Further, can foreign VC firms provide other value-added benefits, such as increased 
internationalization, even if they are not per se associated with portfolio company success 
(Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 2013)? What is the role played by foreign VC firms in 
portfolio companies after the IPO? Foreign VC firms might provide a better contact with 
international investors; facilitate the presence of portfolio companies in foreign markets; and 
they might also provide valuable help in portfolio companies’ internationalization process 
(Chahine and Saade, 2011). Finally, there may be unobserved determinants associated with the 
relocation of portfolio companies such as tax strategies, the size of VC markets, branch offices 
in different countries (e.g., Cumming et al., 2009a).  
 
8. Overall Conclusion 
Although there has been a recent wave of research on international VC, spurred by the 
internationalization of the VC industry, many important questions remain unaddressed and 
warrant further scrutiny. With this paper, we have provided a timely overview of the 
international VC literature and identified important future research directions. We hope that 
with this paper we will foster further research on international VC in multiple disciplines (and 
hopefully also across disciplines) including economics, entrepreneurship, finance, and 
management. 
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Year - Authors Data sources Sample
Literature/theory 
base
Key findings
2008 - Alhorr, 
Moore, & Payne
Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) Platinum (Thomson
Financial Corporation)
24 EU countries for the 
period between
1985 and 2002
Institutional theory When countries’ economies become more integrated (i.e., adoption of a 
common market and a common currency), an increase in the amount of 
international VC investment made into other member countries follows.
2009 - 
Madhavan & 
Iriyama
Thomson VentureXpert, 
IMF, Statistical Yearbook of 
the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service U.S. 
Department of Justice
VC flows from 1982 to 2002 
for all nations that have 
hosted VC flow from the 
U.S. as of 2002 
Network theory, 
Social 
embeddedness 
perspective
Groups of immigrants active in both the home- and host-country 
technical networks, significantly affect international VC flows. 
Professional and technical cumulative immigration levels from a given 
nation to the U.S. predict VC outflows from the U.S. to that nation.
2010a - Guler & 
Guillén
Thomson VentureXpert 216 U.S. VC firms 
potentially investing in 95 
countries during the 1990-
2002 period
Institutional theory (1) VC firms invest in host countries characterized by technological, 
legal, financial, and political institutions that create innovative 
opportunities, protect investors' rights, facilitate exit, and guarantee 
regulatory stability, respectively. (2) As VC firms gain more international 
experience, they are more likely to overcome constraints related to these 
institutions.
2011 - Schertler 
& Tykvová 
Zephyr World wide sample of 
58,377 VC-portfolio 
company (PC) links
Institutional theory, 
Info asymmetry, 
Macro economics
(1) Expected growth differences between the PC’s and VC firm’s country 
are strongly positively related to the number of international deals 
between the two countries. (2) Expected growth in the VC firm's home 
country strongly increases the number of domestic deals, while it 
slightly discourages the number of international deals. (3) A higher 
market capitalization in the VC firm’s home countries leads to more 
domestic as well as foreign deals. (4) The number of deals financed by 
foreign investors increases when the expected growth and the market 
capitalization of the PCs’ countries increase.
2012 - Aizenman 
& Kendall
Thomson VentureXpert Data on VC investments in 
over 100 countries covering 
three decades
/ Distance, common language, and colonial ties are significant 
determinants in directing the international VC and VC flows. Moreover, 
local high end human capital, better business environments, higher 
levels of military expenditure, and larger financial markets are important 
factors that attract international VC. 
Table 1: Selected studies on the country level determinants
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Year - Authors - 
Journal
Data sources Sample
Literature/theory 
base
Key findings
2012 - Schertler 
& Tykvová 
Zephyr Domestic and international 
VC investments in 15 
European countries, the 
U.S, and Canada from 2000 
to 2008
Two country 
demand – supply
framework
Most economic factors shape gross and net inflows in a similar way. 
Two target country economic factors drive gross and net international 
VC inflow differently. Higher expected economic growth leads to higher 
gross as well as net international VC inflows, while more developed 
capital markets and more favorable VC environment results in higher 
gross inflows, but lower net inflows. 
2016 - Bottazzi, 
Da Rin & 
Hellmann 
A survey of 685 VC firms in 
15 European countries. 
Eurostat (trust from the 
citizens of one country 
toward the citizens of 
another country)
107 useable responses on 
survey 
Social capital theory, 
Discrete choice 
framework
(1) Trust has a significant effect on the investment decisions of VC firms 
and on how they structure contracts. (2) Trust among nations 
significantly affects VC firms' investment decisions. Earlier stage 
investments require higher trust and syndication is more valuable in low-
trust situations, (3) Higher trust investors use more contingent 
contracts.
Table 1 (Continued)
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Year - Authors Data sources Sample
Literature/theory 
base
Key findings
2009 - Patzelt, zu 
Knyphausen-
Aufseß & 
Fischer
EVCA yearbook of year 2005 TMTs and portfolio 
strategies of 136 European 
VC firms
Upper echelon 
theory
VC firms with higher proportions of TMT members with international or 
entrepreneurial experience have a broader geographic investment scope.  
2010 - Iriyama, Li 
& Madhavan
Thomson VentureXpert 50,490 region-nation-year 
pairs (i.e. 51 U.S. states, 90 
foreign nations and 11 
years from 1995 to 2006)
Network theory The spread of U.S. international VC investments has a spiky 
geographical pattern as - driven by the spiky international pattern of 
human networks - the linkages between certain regions in the U.S. and 
some foreign countries is exceptionally intense.  
2010 - Cumming 
& Dai 
Thomson VentureXpert Sample of U.S. VC 
investments: 122,248 VC 
company round 
observations, representing 
20,875 companies invested 
by 1,908 VC firms from 1980 -
2009 
Info asymmetry (1) More reputable VC firms (older, larger, more experienced, and with 
stronger IPO track record) and VC firms with broader networks prefer a 
broader geographic scope. (2) VC firm specializing in technology 
industries and using more staging prefer a narrower geographic scope. 
(3) VC firms prefer a narrower geographic scope when they are the lead 
VC and when investing alone.
2011 - Schertler 
& Tykvová
Zephyr World wide sample of 
58,377 VC-PC links
Institutional theory, 
Info asymmetry, 
Macro economics
(1) VC firms with more foreign and domestic experience invest more 
intensely abroad since they are more familiar with the institutional and 
legal environment in foreign countries and have a better access to 
international networks. (2) VC firms with extensive domestic experience 
invest internationally more often since they more easily implement a 
geographical diversification of their portfolios.
2012 - De 
Prijcker, 
Manigart, 
Wright & De 
Maeseneire 
Hand-collected data, 
questionnaires, archival 
data, national and European 
VC associations, Zephyr
110 VC firms from 5 
European countries
Info asymmetry, 
Agency risk, 
Network theory
(1) International human capital of VC firms increases the likelihood to 
operate internationally. (2) VC manager's experience and inherited 
knowledge have a positive effect on internationalization, but external 
knowledge has limited impact. (3) Intense international contacts even 
decrease international activities. (4) Together, these results highlight 
the importance of VC manager's experience and inherited knowledge to 
overcome information asymmetries inherent in the internationalization of 
professional service firms, and of VC firms in particular.
Table 2: Selected studies on the VC firm level determinants of international VC investments
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Year - Authors Data sources Sample
Literature/theory 
base
Key findings
2017 - Vedula & 
Matusik
Thomson VentureXpert 517 first internationalization 
decisions from 2,160 US VC 
firms, representing a sample 
of 12,654 VC firm-year 
observations between 1990 
and 2012.
Institutional 
isomorphism
Social cues drive VC firms' first internationalization decisions. A focal 
VC firm is more likely to internationalize when the number of 
geographically proximal firms with foreign activities increases. A higher 
level of foreign investment activity by syndicate partners also 
positively affects a focal VC firm's first internationalization decision. The 
economic significance of cues from geographically proximal peers is 
much larger than cues from syndicate partners.
Table 2 (Continued)
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Year - Authors Data sources Sample
Literature/theory 
base
Key findings
2002 - Wright, 
Locket & Pruthi
Interviews with VC 
executives 
31 VC firms investing in 
India
Institutional theory, 
Info asymmetry
(1) Foreign (mainly U.S.) VC firms in India place significantly greater 
emphasis on product market factors and accountants’ reports than 
domestic firms in India. (2) They place significantly less emphasis on 
financial contributions of the PC’s management in assessing risk and 
own due diligence and information from entrepreneurs than do U.S. 
firms in their domestic market. (3) High levels of employment of Indian 
nationals afford access to local information networks but foreign firms 
were also more likely to seek other independent info.   
2003 - Pruthi, 
Wright & 
Lockett
Asia Pacific Private Equity 
Bulletin (VC directory), 
questionnaire, face-to-face 
interviews
31 interviews (84% of active 
VC firms in India in year 
2000)
Info asymmetry, 
Agency theory 
(1) Cross-border VC firms are more involved on the strategic level and 
domestic ones on the operational level of steering PCs. (2) Cross-border 
VC firms prefer strategic monitoring and advice which is easier to 
guarantee across distance than monitoring of the operational activities.
2008 - Mäkelä & 
Maula 
58 semi-structured 
interviews, observations and 
several secondary sources 
(Thomson VentureXpert, 
company websites, press 
releases, newspapers,…)
9 PCs from Finland that 
have their primary market in 
foreign nations and were 
invested by at least one 
cross-border VC
Grounded theory 
approach & case 
study, Institutional 
theory
Cross-border VC investors preferably invest in companies to which 
local VC firms have provided operational management advice, 
introduced local contacts and local market knowledge. The importance 
of this preparation by local VC firms is mitigated when the entrepreneurs 
are highly experienced or when the home market is not important for the 
PC. The domestic VC firms hence have an important signalling value 
which facilitates cross-border investment and syndication.
2009 - Bottazzi, 
Da Rin & 
Hellmann 
Survey send to 750 VC firms, 
Amadeus, Worldscope and 
Thomson VentureXpert
1,431 investments from 124 
VC firms in 17 European 
countries for the period 
1998–2001 
Double moral hazard, 
Institutional theory
The VC firm’s home country legal system plays a critical role in their 
behaviour when investing abroad. Better legal systems are associated 
with more VC involvement and the VC investor’s legal system is more 
important than the PC’s in determining investor behaviour even when 
investing abroad. 
2009 - Pruthi, 
Wright & Meyer 
Questionnaire survey with 
qualitative interviews
37 International VC firms; 31 
non-international VC firms 
all investing in the UK
Knowledge-based 
view (exploratory 
approach)
(1) When foreign VC firms establish a local branch, the recruitment of 
local executives is more important than the deployment of expatriates. 
(2) From all suggested motives in literature, the most important reason 
for expatriation is to transfer knowledge. (3) Investment committees play 
a key role in the international decision-making process, they allow 
international VC firms to manage challenges faced by local branches 
that otherwise would require deployment of expatriates. 
Table 3: Selected studies on the strategies used to mitigate liabilities of foreignness 
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Year - Authors Data sources Sample
Literature/theory 
base
Key findings
2010 - Lu & 
Hwang 
EDB (Economic 
Development Board), AVCJ 
(Asia Venture Capital 
Journal), Survey in 1999
34 VC firms investing in 
Singapore responded to 
survey of which 17 are 
international VC firms 
Liabilities of 
foreignness, Info 
asymmetry
Due to liabilities of foreignness, foreign VC firms investing in Singapore 
originate fewer unsolicited deals from their networks compared to 
domestic VC firms. In response to this drawback, international VC firms 
mainly draw upon their home country advantages by attempting to 
originate more solicited deals from networks.
2010b - Guler & 
Guillén 
Thomson VentureXpert 
database, World Bank, 
Henisz’s (2000) Index of 
Political Constraints, CEPII 
geographic distance 
database
All actual and potential 
investments of 1,010 U.S. 
based VC firms active 
between 1990-2002 in 95 
countries
Social network 
theory, Foreign 
expansion theory
Home-country network advantages of U.S. VC firms such as social 
status advantages are transferable from the home country to the target 
country. 
2012 - Dai, Jo & 
Kassicieh
Thomson VentureXpert 
database, SDC Platinum 
M&As, Global New Issues 
Database
2,860 PCs  receiving 4,254 
rounds of VC financing by 
468 VC firms in Asia from 
1996-2006
Info asymmetry In the Asian VC markets, when investing alone, foreign VC firms are 
more likely to invest in more information-transparent (later stage, later 
round) PCs. Partnership with domestic VC firms helps alleviate 
information asymmetry and monitoring problem and has positive 
implication for the exit performance of local entrepreneurial firms.
2015 - Huang, 
Kenney & 
Patton
Thomson VentureXpert 1,095 Chinese PCs, which 
received 3,365 foreign 
investments and 696 
Chinese investments 
between 1992 and 2012
Learning perspective Surprisingly, foreign VC firms are more likely to choose Chinese 
investors in later rounds and in more mature portfolio companies. 
Having a Chinese office made foreign VCs less likely to co-invest.
Table 3 (Continued) 
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Literature/theory 
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Key findings
2005 - Mäkelä & 
Maula
58 semi-structured 
interviews, observations and 
several secondary sources 
(Thomson VentureXpert, 
company websites, press 
releases, newspapers,…)
9 PCs from Finland that 
have their primary market in 
foreign nations and were 
invested by at least one 
cross-border VC firm
Grounded theory 
approach, Case 
studies, Institutional 
theory
Foreign VC firms located in a PC’s target market of internationalization 
can be valuable for the venture by legitimizing the unknown new PC in 
that market. However, foreign investors tend to drive PC towards their 
home markets, and the benefits may turn into disadvantages if the target 
market differs from the home markets of the foreign investors. 
2006 - Mäkelä & 
Maula
58 semi-structured 
interviews, observations and 
several secondary sources 
(Thomson VentureXpert, 
company websites, press 
releases, newspapers,…)
8 PCs from Finland that 
were invested by at least 
one domestic and one cross-
border VC firm
Grounded theory 
approach, Case 
studies, Commitment 
theory 
Changes in a PC’s prospects influence the VC firm’s commitment. This 
relationship magnified by the VC firm’s geographical distance and 
mitigated by the relative investment size and the investor’s 
embeddedness in local syndication networks.
2009 - Cumming, 
Fleming & 
Schwienbacher
Hand collected dataset from 
VC firms operating in the 
Asia-Pacific region using 
Asian Venture Capital 
Journal’s Annual Guides; 
Asian Venture Capital 
Journal, Australian Venture 
Capital Journal, and 
Thomson VentureXpert
53 VC funds involving 468 
PCs an 12 countries in Asia-
Pacific region from 1989-
2001
Institutional theory (1) Relocations to the U.S. are motivated by economic conditions as well 
as an improvement in the laws of the country in which the 
entrepreneurial company is based. (2) Relocations to the U.S. yield 
much greater returns to Asia-Pacific VC firms than investing in 
companies already based in the U.S. at the time of VC investment. (3) 
More experienced Asia-Pacific VC firms have greater success with their 
PC relocations to the U.S., and these relocations yield higher returns 
relative to staying in their country of origin.
2013 - Devigne, 
Vanacker, 
Manigart & 
Paeleman
VICO dataset, including 
Thomson ONE, Zephyr, 
PATSTAT, 
country specific databases, 
press releases, press 
clippings
and websites.
761 European VC backed 
companies 
Resource based view Companies initially backed by domestic VC investors exhibit higher 
growth in the short term compared to companies backed by cross-
border investors. In contrast, companies initially backed by cross-
border VC investors exhibit higher growth in the medium term. Finally, 
companies that are initially funded by a syndicate comprising both 
domestic and cross-border VC investors exhibit the highest growth. 
Overall, this study provides a more fine-grained understanding of the 
role that domestic and cross-border VC investors can play as their PCs 
grow and thereby require different resources or capabilities over time
Table 4: Selected studies on outcomes from the perspective of the portfolio company (PC)
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Literature/theory 
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2016 - Devigne, 
Manigart & 
Wright
VICO dataset, including 
Thomson ONE, Zephyr, 
PATSTAT, 
country specific databases, 
press releases, press 
clippings
and websites.
Longitudinal data on 1,618 
unique VC investment 
rounds in European firms 
by 1,060 different VC firms. 
The unit of analysis is the 
investment decision of each 
single VC firm in a portfolio 
company. The data set 
includes 3,445 investment 
decisions: 2,399 by 
domestic VC investors, 568 
by cross-border VC 
investors, and 255 by 
branch VC investors. 
Escalation of 
commitment
Domestic VC firms have a high tendency to escalate their commitment to 
a failing course of action. Cross-border VC investors, however, 
terminate their investments efficiently, even when investing through a 
local branch. 
Table 4 (Continued)
 
45 
 
Year - Authors Data sources Sample
Literature/theory 
base
Key findings
2007 - Hursti & 
Maula 
SDC Platinum New Issues 
Database, IPO prospectuses 
(from Pioneer database of 
perfect information Ltd.), 
Datastream
2,862 IPOs made by EU VC 
firms between 1991 -2001 (of 
which 163 are foreign IPOs)
Institutional theory Pre-IPO ownership by cross-border VC investors is positively related to 
foreign IPOs.
2009 - Knill Galante’s Venture Capital 
and Private Equity Directory 
and Thomson Financial’s 
SDC Platinum
Investment preferences of 
the 500 largest U.S. VC and 
PE firms + information on 
PC from Thomson 
Financial's SDC Platinum
Portfolio theory Compared to industry, stage and domestic geographical diversification, 
international geographical diversification is the only diversification 
strategy which has no negative impact on the PC's exit performance. As 
such, it is possible that VC firms can use this form of diversification to 
reduce risk and potentially grow their VC firm without impacting the PC 
exit performance.
2011 - Chahine 
& Saade
Securities Data Company 
(SDC) database
410 randomly selected U.S. 
VC backed IPOs from 1997-
2007 (represents 30.5% of 
all VC backed IPOs)
Institutional theory, 
Agency theory
(1) U.S. IPOs' underpricing is negatively related to the weighted average 
legal protection rights’ index of VC firms’ country of origin within the 
VC syndicate of an IPO firm. This negative association is stronger for 
IPOs involving foreign VC firms. (2) Legal protection rights of foreign 
VC firms and board independence of IPO firms play a complementary 
role in reducing underpricing. This suggests that foreign VC firms from 
countries with a higher legal protection rights are likely to invest in PCs 
with better governance, and this reduces underpricing. (3) Results are 
robust when controlling for selection bias of IPO firms by foreign VC 
firms. (4) Evidence of a positive effect of the legal protection rights of 
VC firms on the long-term performance of their PCs.
2011 - Wang & 
Wang 
Zero2IPO, Thomson 
VentureXpert
495 VC investments 
between 1999 and 2006 by 
84 foreign VC firms in 243 
Chinese domestic 
companies
Institutional theory (1) Foreign VC firms' human capital (experience, networks and 
reputation) is not correlated with VC performance. (2) Domestic 
entrepreneurs' experience is crucial to VC performance. 
Table 5: Selected studies on outcomes from the perspective of the VC firm 
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2012 - Wang & 
Wang 
Thomson VentureXpert 10,205 cross-border VC 
investments by 1,906 
foreign VC firms in 6,535 
PCs from 35 countries 
between 1995-2005
Economic theory, 
Institutional theory
(1) PC country's economic freedom plays a crucial role in determining 
cross-border VC performance. In more economically free countries, 
foreign VC-backed PCs are more likely to be successfully exited (IPO or 
an M&A), and investment durations are shorter. (2) Cross-border VC 
performance is also strongly associated to other PC country 
characteristics. The GDP per capita is negatively correlated to the 
probability and hazard of a successful exit, legality is positively related 
to cross-border VC performance and the PC country's entrepreneurial 
activity is positively related to the probability of a successful exit. (3) PC 
quality and local VC firms' participation have a positive impact, while 
early stage investments and VC firms' portfolio size have a negative 
impact, on the likelihood of a successful exit. 
2012 - Dai, Jo & 
Kassicieh 
Thomson VentureXpert 
database, SDC Platinum 
M&As, Global New Issues 
Database
2,860 PCs  receiving 4,254 
rounds of VC financing by 
468 VC firms in Asia from 
1996-2006
Info asymmetry Partnership with domestic VC firms has positive implication for the exit 
performance of local PCs. Specifically, PCs with both foreign and local 
VC partnership are about 5% more likely to successfully exit.
2013 - 
Humphery-
Jenner & 
Suchard 
ChinaVenture 4,753 Chinese / Hong Kong 
portfolio companies that 
received capital between 
1988-2011
Networking theory, 
Info asymmetry, 
Portfolio theory
(1) The presence of a foreign VC firm by itself does not per se increase 
the probability of a successful exit. (2) Syndication with local VC firms 
increases the probability of a successful exit for foreign VC firms. (3) If a 
foreign VC successfully exits an investment, then, compared with a 
domestic VC, it prefers to exit via a M&A or a secondary-buyout as 
opposed to through an IPO. This reflects the significant lock-up periods 
associated with VC-backed IPOs in China and the difficulty of achieving 
a foreign listing on Chinese stock markets. (4) The impact of foreign VC 
firms on performance depends both on the characteristics of the 
investment as of the VC firm, it is higher when  investing in later stage 
PCs and when the VC is diversified across industries.  
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Year - Authors Data sources Sample
Literature/theory 
base
Key findings
2014 - Nahata, 
Hazarika & 
Tandon
Thomson VentureXpert, 
SDC Platinum M&As, Global 
New Issues Database
9,153 PCs from 32 countries 
(North America is excluded) 
invested between 1996 and 
2002 
Info asymmetry (1) Superior legal rights (and enforcement) and better-developed stock 
markets enhance VC performance. (2) Cultural distance between 
countries of the PC and its lead investor positively affects VC success. 
(3) Cultural differences create incentives for rigorous ex-ante screening, 
improving VC performance, particularly in emerging economies.
2014 - Bertoni & 
Groh
VICO dataset, including 
Thomson ONE, Zephyr, 
PATSTAT, country specific 
databases, press releases, 
press clippings and 
websites.
422 firms from 7 European 
countries and 1,062 VC 
investments, including 190 
cross-border investments
Socio-economic and 
institutional 
perspectives
Trade sale exits are facilitated by the additional size of the M&A market 
in the international VC firm's home market. The effect for IPOs is weaker; 
the IPO volume of the international VC firm's home market is only 
significant in some specifications. Finally, syndicates with cross-border 
investors exit underperforming PCs earlier.
2016 - 
Chemmanur, 
Hull & Krishnan 
Thomson VentureXpert 30,071 VC backed 
companies from 41 
countries between 1989-
2008 
Institutional theory, 
Syndication
Controlling for potential endogeneity concerns, PCs (particularly in 
emerging countries) backed by syndicates composed of international 
and domestic VC firms have more successful exits and higher post-IPO 
operating performance than those backed by syndicates of purely 
international or purely local VC firms. 
2016 - Cumming, 
Knill & Syvrud 
SDC Platinum's 
VentureXpert, M&A and 
Global New Issues database
67,635 PC/VC investment 
observations for 31,942 
unique PCs, which 
represents 81 PC domicile 
nations and 36 VC domicile 
nations. 
Liabilities of 
foreignness, 
resources, networks
Syndicates with a cross-border investor base have a higher probability 
of exiting via an initial public offering (IPO) and higher IPO proceeds. 
The benefits of cross-border investors in M&A exits are less 
pronounced.
2018 - Chahine, 
Saade & 
Goergen
Thomson Financial 
Securities Data Company 
(SDC), VentureXpert, 
Datastream, company 
websites, IPO prospectus, 
and LinkedIn.
1,086 VC-backed US IPOs 
from 1995 to 2011. 
Liabilities of 
foreignness
Mixed syndicates including domestic and foreign VC firms certify the 
quality of PCs at the time of the IPO, thereby increasing their IPO 
premium. Foreign VC firms also play an advisory role (thereby 
increasing foreign business activities of their US investees) and a 
monitoring role when the investee's foreign activities originate from the 
foreign VC's market.
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